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ABSTRACT
Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the
other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide
experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for
the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a “random strangers” design in
which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance
that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so
small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present
evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.
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1 Andreoni and Croson [2005].
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Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand,
when testing one-shot games many experimenters conduct sequences of multiple games with
subjects, to provide experience and to collect a larger set of observations. We consider the difficulty
of drawing inferences about static game theory using repeated game experiments. To avoid subjects
rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters often
employ techniques that minimize or eliminate the probability that subjects meet more than once. In a
“Random Strangers” design subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some
chance that subjects will meet multiple times, but it is believed that this chance is so small that
subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. In fact, this belief is so strong that it has
been referred to as a “repeated single-shot” design.1 In a “Perfect Strangers” design a matching
algorithm is used that guarantees that subjects meet only once. The polar opposite is a “Partners”
design where the same subjects are pitted against each other for each round in a repeated game. We
examine whether subjects perceive a Random Strangers experiment the same way that they perceive a
Perfect Strangers experiment, such that the former can be used to reliably implement static games in
the laboratory.
Comparisons of Partners and Random Strangers designs have been common since Andreoni
[1988] reported the counter-intuitive result that the latter generates a greater amount of cooperation
than the former. Most of the replications and variations of this experiment have found no significant
difference in behavior, and a few even report the opposite, more intuitive, pattern. Nevertheless, if
one is interested in testing one-shot theories, these experiments are not very informative since it is
unclear to what extent Random Strangers implements sufficient control on the strategic environment
perceived by subjects. To date, there have been no systematic test of Random Strangers versus
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Perfect Strangers, which is surprising given the popularity of the former. We provide evidence from
public goods experiments that shows that the assumption that Random Strangers is the same as Perfect
Strangers is not always true. We find that the fraction of subjects that play the game strictly by the non-
cooperative Nash Equilibrium prediction is significantly higher in Perfect Strangers. The difference is
40 percentage points, a noticeable fraction of our subjects. 
The Random Strangers design is by far the most popular operational counterpart of a one-
shot environment in experiments. N subjects are recruited into a session in which subjects are paired
into groups of K<N in each round. We assume without loss of generality that N is an integer
multiple of K. In the Random Strangers design the K subjects in each group are picked at random
from the N subjects, obviously without replacement. There is therefore some chance, varying in N
and K, that any one subject will see the same subject in a later period providing that the subjects are
not in the last round. This chance gets small very quickly as N increases in relation to K, and on the
basis of this arithmetic it is usually assumed to be an adequate procedure that ensures that subjects
behave as if the chance is actually zero. Occasionally, subjects are told that these chances are very
small.
The Perfect Strangers design, on the other hand, picks pairings in a way that ensures that no
subject will ever be paired with the same person in later rounds. The only problem with the Perfect
Strangers design is that it is “subject hungry.” For K>2, and N around 20 or so, it becomes difficult
to run sessions with more than a few rounds. But the Perfect Strangers design is the one that literally
matches the one-shot notion that underlies the theories being tested in the lab.
Experimenters know all of this, and yet it is surprising to find virtually no studies that 
systematically compare behavior in Perfect Strangers and Random Strangers settings.  In addition to
its popular use in comparisons between one-shot and repeated play games, the Random Strangers
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design is frequently used in other experimental investigations, particularly those involving public
goods and auctions. We consider as an example the classic public goods voluntary contribution game.
Apart from it’s intrinsic importance, it has been the context for many valuable tests of the role of
Random Strangers and Partners designs.
In section 1 we briefly review the literature on comparisons of behavior in one-shot versus
repeated public goods settings, where the Random Strangers design has been used to model the one-
shot setting. In section 2 we introduce a simple experimental design in which we compare the
Random Strangers  and Perfect Strangers designs. We find that the assumption that subjects treat Random
Strangers designs as if they were one-shot experiments is false. Our subjects behave in a systematically different
manner in the Perfect Strangers design. In fact, we can show that the Perfect Strangers design is
associated with more subjects adopting a strict free-riding behavior consistent with the one-shot
theory, rather than with subjects simply providing smaller contributions conditional on making some
contribution. Thus the use of the Perfect Strangers design seems to encourage a qualitative change in the
way subjects view the game, with more of them thinking the game through in the strategic manner
assumed by game theory. Section 4 re-analyzes the data from two of the previous experiments that
have examined Partners and Random Strangers, and shows that their results are consistent with these
conclusions.
1. Partners, Random Strangers, and Perfect Strangers 
A. Theoretical Issues
Why do we worry about Strangers designs at all, let alone whether they are Random Strangers
or Perfect Strangers? The short answer is that any multiple round game can cause reputation effects,
such that play in one round can be influenced by the expectation of meeting the same player in a later
2 Chess reminds us that backward induction is not an “all or nothing” thing behaviorally.
3 For textbook expositions, see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991; ch.4,5] or Binmore [1992; ch.8].
Obviously repeated games are interesting in their own right. Our concern is with the difficulty of drawing
inferences about static game theory using repeated game experiments. The task of drawing inferences about
repeated game strategy choices from observed actions in repeated game experiments is actually a delicate one:
see Engle-Warnick and Slonim [2006] for a discussion of the issues and a proposed methodology
-4-
round. Strategically, of course, such reputation effects do not always affect predicted play.  If the
game has a finite and known number of repetitions, if the stage game in any single round has only
one Nash Equilibrium (NE), and if it is common knowledge that all players can backward induct for
the horizon of the game,2 then the NE of the repeated game is just a “degenerate” succession of NE
of the stage games. Nevertheless, if one relaxes any of the three conditions just noted, then there may
be many NE of the repeated game that differ from degenerate, successive plays of the NE of the
stage game.3
The public good games considered in the experimental literature are virtually identical in form
to the prisoners’ dilemma games considered in repeated game theory. In the standard form of both
games there is invariably a single NE of the stage game. Most experiments provide subjects with a
known and finite horizon. Some experiments leave the final horizon indeterminate, which can
generate many of the same effects as having an infinite horizon. But the one thing we cannot easily
control in experiments is the knowledge that subjects have about the other players. If the common
knowledge assumption does not hold, the one-shot theory prediction is not the appropriate one to
use since players may strategically want to create reputations. Thus, if the Random Strangers design
introduces reputation effects, or even just perceived reputation effects, the appropriate theoretical
domain is not one of static non-cooperative games.
We therefore hypothesize that behavior in Perfect Strangers will be significantly more like the
non-cooperative one-shot NE prediction than Random Strangers. In addition we vary the size of the
4 The same is true of the extensive early experimental literature on first-price sealed-bid auctions.
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cohort from which subjects are matched in Random Strangers (i.e. we vary N) expecting to see
behavior approaching that of Perfect Strangers as the probability of being re-matched with the same
person declines.
B. Previous Experiments
The experimental literature on public goods has a long tradition of being concerned with the
strategic importance of differentiating between “Partners and Strangers.” However, it is striking that
virtually all of the Strangers designs have been what we call Random Strangers.
The earliest public goods experiments were conducted exclusively with a Partners design.4
However, the presumption was that the game would be viewed by subjects as a finite-horizon
repeated game in which the sole NE was the same outcome as the NE of the stage game. For
example, Isaac and Walker [1988; p.195] state this position clearly:
The results across all periods are not supportive of the multi-period Nash equilibria
prediction of zero contribution in every period (based upon a backwards induction
argument). Instead, the experiments uniformly begin with positive contributions [...]
followed by a tendency for contributions to decay. This decay pattern is consistent
with the experimental results cited by Kreps et al. [1982], and it suggests that the
incomplete information models should also be a fruitful line of theoretical inquiry for
public goods research.
Of course, an alternative is to consider the effects of experimental designs that mitigate the role of
reputation effects under incomplete information.
Andreoni [1988] initiated this approach in the experimental literature, explicitly contrasting
what he termed Partners and Strangers. The Strangers design in his experiments were Random
Strangers: 20 subjects were randomly assigned to 4 groups of 5 in each of 10 rounds. He reports that
Random Strangers contributed more, on average, than Partners. This counter-intuitive  result
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generated a flurry of interest, as discussed below.  At an “eyeball” level the average contributions in
each treatment are compared, round by round (Table 1, p.296). Partners contribute an average of 16.6
tokens over 10 rounds, and Random Strangers contribute an average of 20.7 tokens, for a difference
of 4.1 tokens. The problem, noted by Croson [1996; p.30] and Palfrey and Prisbey [1996; p.413], is
that there is a significant standard deviation in contributions, around 16 tokens per round in each
treatment. The test used by Andreoni [1988; p.296, fn. 9] is a median test applied to all individual
contributions over all rounds. The null hypothesis here is that the Partners and Random Strangers
samples arise from populations with the same median, and he reports that this null can be rejected
with a p-value of less than 0.01. Of course, this test assumes that the samples are random (Conover
[1980; p.171]), and this is violated by the temporal dependence between rounds and subjects. We
examine this hypothesis later, using an econometric specification which accounts for some of the
features of these data and that is comparable to the analysis of our own data. To anticipate, we find
that there is no statistically significant evidence of differences between Partners and Random
Strangers in the data from Andreoni [1988].
Weimann [1994] undertook a replication of the Andreoni [1988] conclusion, but his
experiments also changed the design in a way that makes them hard to compare. In his Strangers
experiments the subjects were contacted by phone, after receiving instructions and a record form in
the mail, rather than in some common setting. This has the advantage of complete anonymity, of
course, but it also means that the subjects cannot verify that they are being randomly paired. As it
happens, two of the variations on the baseline experiments employed deception, further clouding the
credibility of inferences. In any event, Weimann [1994] concludes that he did not replicate the
conclusion of Andreoni [1988].
Croson [1996] replicated the Andreoni [1988] design and also found different results.
5  The classification of these results in Andreoni and Croson [2005; Table 1] does not match the
conclusions of the original study. They classify the British subjects as contributing more on the Strangers
design compared to the Partners design, whereas the original study finds no difference; they classify the Italian
subjects as contributing more in the Partners design compared to the Strangers design, but this is due to some
differences following a restart, rather than in initial rounds of behavior. Burlando and Hey [1997; p.53-4] note
that “... for the UK subjects the partners percentage was 86.64 as compared to 85.65 for the strangers – a
difference that is not statistically significant (p=0.2073); for the Italians, the partners percentage was 70.62 as
compared with 73.38 for the strangers – a difference that is significant according to a [Wilcoxon rank-sum
test] at 1% (p=0.0051). Interestingly, this difference is largely driven by the difference in behavior between the
first and second sub-sessions among the Italian subjects – in the second sub-session partners free-rode much
less than strangers [...]. Perhaps by then they had learned that co-operation was a good thing?” The
percentages they refer to are the percentages of the bad that was placed in the public domain. So “dumping”
more  in the public domain here amounts to free riding more and contributing less.
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Although she does not report the average contributions, inspection of her Figure 1 (p.28) indicates
that contributions in the Partners treatments were roughly 4 to 5 tokens higher than those in the
Random Strangers treatments, relative to an endowment of 25 tokens in each round. But the same
concern with the variation of individual contributions arises. She reports (Table 2, p.30) standard
deviations in each treatment around 8 tokens in each round. Using a Wilcoxon test, despite its
assumption that observations are independent, she rejects the hypothesis that the contributions are
the same, in favor of higher contributions in the Partners treatment. We also re-consider these results
later, using an econometric specification to help us identify the sources of these differences, and
verify these conclusions.
Burlando and Hey [1997] also fail to replicate the conclusion claimed by Andreoni [1988].
They find no significant difference between Partners and Random Strangers overall, although there
are some minor interaction effects depending on the national location of the experiments and the
sequencing.5 It would be useful to see how much of the differences across nations is due to national
effects rather than from differences in individual characteristics, as noted by  Botelho, Harrison,
Hirsch and Rutström [2005] in the context of cross-national bargaining experiments, but the raw data
on individual characteristics was not collected for the British subjects (p.47, fn.10).
6 Andreoni and Croson [2005; Table 1] and Keser and van Winden [2000; p. 24] claim that these data
show that Strangers contribute more than Partners, but this may just be due to them being willing to accept a
p-value this high.
7 Keser and van Winden [2000; p. 24] claim that these data show that Strangers have a higher
variance in contributions  than Partners, but this is likely due to a misreading of a claim by Palfrey and Prisbey
[1996; p.424] about the dispersion in the fitted parameter  of a specific model estimated from these treatments.
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Palfrey and Prisbey [1996] conduct an experiment that compares Partners and Random
Strangers, along with other treatments. Their subjects participated in 40-round games, broken into 4
treatments. In each round the subject received a random “exchange rate” that would convert their
tokens into points. Each subject received a different exchange rate each round, and the subjects in
the same group of 4 received different exchange rates. These exchange rates were drawn uniformly at
random as integers between 1 and 20. In the first 20 rounds each subject received a fixed group
return, and then a new, fixed group return in the last 20 rounds. These returns were “low” and then
“high.” In each 10-round sequence each subject received a random private return. Subjects were
either in a Partners treatment for the entire 40 rounds or in a Random Strangers treatment for the
entire 40 rounds. They find average contributions of 3.46 tokens in the Partners treatment and 3.71
in the Random Strangers treatment, out of endowments of 9 tokens. The standard deviation of each
is 3.68 tokens and 3.60 tokens. One cannot reject the null hypothesis of identical mean contribution
levels using a t-test (p=0.13),6 nor can one reject the null hypothesis of identical variances in
contributions using an F-test (p=0.51).7 These results are even stronger if one only considers the
responses in the first round, although sample sizes become very small since there were only 24
subjects in each of the main treatments.
Keser and van Winden [2000] provide convincing evidence that Partners contribute more
than Random Strangers in stationary public good experiments. A key feature of their design was
simply to increase the number of replications in each treatment, so that they had 6 sessions with the
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Random Strangers treatment and 10 sessions with the Partners treatment, spanning 160 subjects.
They found that average contributions were 1.9 tokens and 4.53 tokens, out of an endowment of 10,
across the two treatments.
Andreoni and Croson [2005] review the literature on public goods contributions with
Partners and Random Strangers. They discuss additional studies examining these treatments, but in
which there was some other design change.
Fehr and Gächter [2000; fn.3] report the only evidence we know of comparing Random
Strangers and Perfect Strangers in a public goods experiment. They note briefly that the results of a
Perfect Strangers replication of their design generated essentially the same results as their Random
Strangers experiments.  However, they only considered one sequence of regimes (Punishment
followed by Non-Punishment), and did not maintain the Perfect Strangers treatment after the first
regime of 6 periods. In other words, subjects that were matched only once in rounds 1-6 might have
been matched again in rounds 7-12, thereby reducing the Perfect Strangers control. Moreover, one
would have to control for the history generated by following a related experiment, as we do below, to
be able to draw any inferences about the effects of Perfect Strangers rather than Random Strangers in
a Non-Punishment game. Rather than debate if such comparisons are conclusive, we prefer to ensure
the control against any reputational effects afforded by a Perfect Strangers design.
Generally, the comparisons of behavior in Partners and Random Strangers in this literature
has led to interpretations that involve preferences with social arguments such as altruism or “warm
glow.” We introduce the alternative hypothesis that some subjects did not perceive the Random
Strangers experiments as one-shot game environments, but strategically based their decisions on the
presence of reputation effects.
8 Most public goods experiments use four subjects per group, although the effect of larger group
sizes has been studied by Isaac and Walker [1988] and others. Harrison and Hirshleifer [1989] and Goeree,
Holt and Laury [2002] employed groups of 2 in their public goods experiments.
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2. Experimental Design 
Each subject participated in an experimental session in which there were 10 rounds of a
traditional voluntary contribution public goods game. Subjects participate in groups of 2 in each
round.8 We explain to subjects how we ensure that there is no chance that they will meet the same
person in any other round.
Our experiments also had some other task after the initial 10 rounds, or in a prior 10 rounds.
This task was a “sanctions” public goods game in the spirit of Fehr and Gächter [2000]. The results
of those experiments are not of interest here, but we control for them in the statistical analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. Thirteen sessions were conducted. The first
four used Perfect Strangers designs, and the last nine used Random Strangers designs. We varied the
size of the cohort in the Random Strangers design from 6 to 16 participants. Subjects were aware that
different participants were in cohorts of different size, making this a salient feature of the design. We
hypothesize that increasing the size of the cohort in Random Strangers will reduce the perceived
reputation effect and make behavior more similar to Perfect Strangers. Each subject received an
endowment of 20 tokens at the outset of each round, and each token was worth 5 cents.
In two sessions we used a relatively low return on contributions to the public good, and in all
other sessions we used a relatively high return. The low return was 0.6 of token: hence every token
contributed to the public good by one subject would decrease their private endowment by 1 token
and return 0.6 of a token for herself. Of course, it would also generate 0.6 of a token for the other
player, so the social return was 1.2 tokens for every 1 token invested. In the high return treatment we
changed the public good return from 0.6 to 0.8, thereby increasing the social return from 20% to
9 Isaac and Walker [1988] carefully discuss the relationship between changes in group size and the
implied MPCR. They use MPCR values of 0.3 and 0.75, and refer to the latter as high. So our values tend to
be “high” in relation to the ones they consider.
10 Alternative assumptions about the factors motivating subjects to contribute in public goods
experiments have long been studied. See, in particular, Palfrey and Prisbrey [1996][1997] and Goeree, Holt
and Laury [2002].
11 UCF is located in Orlando, Florida. It has a large student body, with Fall 2004 enrollment of
42,837. The entering class in 2004 had an average SAT of 1,186. The student body is also ethnically divers: in
2004 8.5% stated that they were Black and Non-Hispanic; 70% stated that they were White and
Non-Hispanic; 5.0% stated that they were Asian; and 12.2% stated that they were Hispanic.
12 All instructions, scripts, and software are available at http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu. The latest version of
the z-Tree software and documentation is available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/ztree/index.php.
13 A digital recording of the oral instructions in one typical session is available at the ExLab archive.
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60%. The objective of this treatment was to see the effects of making the environment more
rewarding to any strategy that would increase contributions to the public good. In terms of the
marginal per capita return (MPCR) to contributing, which is just the ratio of the return from the
public good contribution to the return from the implicit private good contribution, these are 0.60 and
0.80, respectively.9
We used a linear payoff schedule which was constant for all contributions, so the dominant
strategy is simple: a subject that only seeks to maximize individual earnings in a single period should
contribute nothing to the public good.10
We recruited 180 subjects from the University of Central Florida (UCF) in 2005.11 Subjects
were randomly assigned to each session, with no prior knowledge of the parameters or treatments.
The sessions were all conducted at the Behavioral Research Lab of the College of Business
Administration of UCF. This facility is a standard, computerized laboratory: each station has a
“sunken” monitor, and we employed personal “cubicle-style” screens to ensure even more privacy.
Instructions were provided in written form and orally, and the experiment was implemented using
version 2.1.4 of the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher [1999].12 The same experimenter
(Rutström) delivered the oral instructions for all sessions, to ensure comparability.13 The oral
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instructions also utilized a large-screen display that could be easily seen by all subjects, to ensure that
certain information was common knowledge. Training rounds were included prior to each regime, to
ensure that subjects understood the task.
The average subject earned $39 in these experiments, including a standard $5 show-up fee.
No session lasted more than 2 hours, and most were at least 1½ hours in length.
3. Results
Figure 1 displays average contributions over each round of our experiments, pooling data for
each of the Perfect Strangers and Random Strangers  treatments. Maximum token contributions in
each round could be 20, and we observe average contributions starting out at around 5 and 8 tokens
and steadily declining. Average Perfect Strangers contributions are consistently lower than those in
the Random Strangers  treatment, consistent with our hypothesis that the former is more like the
one-shot non-cooperative environment than the latter. However, these raw results do not control for
a number of possible confounds. Two of our Perfect Strangers sessions had lower returns to the
public good, there could be some effect from the previous history of the experiment, and there might
be sampling differences across treatments that are associated with individual characteristics. To
account for these possible effects we turn to a statistical analysis that conditions on them.
Our analysis employs a likelihood function that is constructed to be appropriate for this type
of experiment. Theory tells us that there may be some individuals that gravitate to one particular
contribution level: contribute zero. The raw data also flag this as a “spike” that needs to be addressed
explicitly. Figure 2 shows the distribution of fractional contributions in each treatment, pooled over
all periods. The mode at zero is evident. Figure 3 shows the same distribution in the initial round with
a similar mode at zero. More subjects seem to focus on the zero contribution from the outset in the
14 See Coller, Harrison and McInnes [2002] for an application.
15 As is well known, one can alternatively estimate the two parts of the hurdle model separately and
obtain consistent and efficient estimates (McDowell [2003]).
16 In order to compare the estimation results based on our data to that of Andreoni [1988] and
Croson [1996] we use fractions, since the initial endowments used across these three studies differ.
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Perfect Strangers environment. Our statistical analysis therefore considers the process by which some
subject decides to contribute zero or some positive amount as separate from the process by which
the subject decides how much to contribute.
The natural specification to capture this intuition from theory and the raw data is a “hurdle
model.” This specification is common in health economics, for example, where it is used to capture
the idea that the factors that cause someone to seek medical care are distinct from the factors that
cause the doctor and patient to decide how much to spend.14  In this case going to the doctor is the
hurdle that must be passed before expenditures would be positive. In our case the subject has to
decide whether to contribute any amount at all, and only then does the process determining the
positive contribution level apply.
The likelihood function for the overall hurdle model is constructed as the product of two
likelihoods.15 The first component is the likelihood that the subject contributed zero or not, and uses
a standard probit specification defined over an index function xi", where " is a parameter vector to
be estimated and xi is a vector of explanatory variables for observation i. The second component is
the conditional  likelihood that the subject contributed a certain fraction of the endowment. This
likelihood function is constructed using the specification developed by Papke and Wooldridge [1996]
for fractional dependant variables, since the dependant variable in this case is the fraction of the
endowment contributed (conditional on any positive contribution).16 Thus the log-likelihood of
observation i is defined as li($) = Ci × log[G(xi$)] + (1-Ci) × log[1-G(xi$)] for contribution fraction
Ci, parameter vector $, and some convenient cumulative distribution function G(@). We use the
17 This variable takes on the value 0 for the Perfect Strangers treatment and the size of the cohort
(from Table 1) for the Random Strangers treatments. Thus it can be viewed as an interaction between the
Perfect Strangers treatment and cohort size.
-14-
standard normal cumulative distribution function G(z) = M(z). Thus the overall likelihood function
for the hurdle model requires the estimation of " and $. Since our data is a panel we use a
specification that treats observations as independent across subjects but not within.
Explanatory variables include individual demographics and treatment effects. In addition to a
binary dummy variable for the Perfect Strangers designs (Pstrangers), we also include dummy
variables for the size of the cohort conditional on the use of a Random Strangers design (Csize).17 If
differences in behavior between Perfect Strangers and Random Strangers is due to perceived
reputation effects, we expect a smaller cohort in Random Strangers to be correlated with a stronger
difference in behavior from Perfect Strangers. We also include treatment dummies for the structure
of the game during periods 1-10 (np_p), and the use of high rewards to contributing to the public
good (High). Demographics include a measure of age in years (Age), binary indicators for sex (Male),
race (Black, Asian, Hispanic or Other Race), academic major (Business), class standing (PreSenior),
cumulative GPA below 3¼ (GPAlow), cumulative GP above 3¾ (GPAhigh), number of people in
the subject’s household (Hhsize), and a binary indicator of those that work part-time or full-time
(Work). Table 2 lists descriptive statistics for these variables.
Table 3 provides maximum likelihood estimates of the hurdle model for these data. All
estimates for the " parameter represent the calculated marginal effect of that variable on the
probability of contributing. The reported estimates for the $ are the marginal effects in terms of the
positive fraction of tokens contributed.
The focus variable is the Pstrangers binary dummy. It clearly has a large and statistically
significant effect on the decision to contribute something or nothing, and virtually no impact on the
18 This is a possibility since in the np_p treatment the experiment comes before the other task and
subjects are not made explicitly aware of an additional 10 rounds in the second task, although they know of
the second task itself. In the alternative treatment the experiment comes after the other task, so subjects know
for sure that they are matched up with people from their cohort over a total of 20 periods.
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level of positive contributions. This is striking evidence that the Perfect Strangers treatment affects
qualitative behavior, in the sense that it elicits more subjects to focus on the zero contribution response. Subjects are
on average 30 percentage points more likely to be free riders in the Perfect Strangers treatments, and
this effect is statistically significant (p-value = 0.055). This is clear evidence that a Random Strangers
environment does not elicit the same behavior as a comparable Perfect Strangers environment, and
that the direction of the change in behavior is consistent with the Perfect Strangers environment
being more conducive to subjects viewing the stage game as one-shot.
The effect of increasing the size of the cohort from which subjects are matched is to lower
the probability of contributing by 2.4 percentage points for every extra member of the cohort. The
difference between Random Strangers and Perfect Strangers is therefore diminishing in the size of
the Random Strangers cohort. Since the reference cohort is the smallest one, consisting of 6
individuals, we predict that an increase in the size of the cohort by 11, to a size of 17, would
approximate the Perfect Strangers environment for this experiment where we have pair-wise
matching and a total of 20 periods.
We also find that the ordering of the experiments, as first or second in the real-time sequence,
also makes a large difference to contributions. When the experiment comes before the other task, and
variable np_p equals 1, the probability of being a free rider is 0.25 lower on average. Perhaps this is
related to the fact that subjects in the Random Strangers experiment may underestimate the total
number of rounds during which they will be randomly rematched within their cohort, thus leading to
a lower perceived reputation effect than when they have already played 10 rounds.18 
19 The size of the marginal effect for each period appears to be too large, but is appropriate given that
each dummy has an average sample value of 0.1, and the effects are each measured relative to period 1.
20 Generously provided by James Andreoni and Rachel Croson.
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Increases in the reward to contributing to the public good are associated with significant
reductions in free riding, and significant increases in the amount contributed when someone does
contribute something. This is consistent with previous observations in public goods experiments, as
is the fact that the passage of time increases the likelihood of a subject becoming a free rider. The
marginal effects of the period dummies on " in Table 3 show a significant and steady decline after
period 3.19
There are some clear demographic effects on contributions, particularly in terms of the
fraction of contributions conditional on making any contribution. Men are actually more generous
once they decide to contribute, even though there is an offsetting (and less statistically significant)
effect on the decision to contribute. Those with a lower GPA are much more likely to contribute
something, although they tend to contribute less once they decide to contribute something.
4. Comparisons to the Previous Experiments
Our econometric model of contributions allows us to re-examine data from the previous
experiments of Andreoni [1988] and Croson [1996] using statistical methods that are comparable to
our own. Using data on individual contributions,20 we estimate the same hurdle model with controls
for the key Partners versus Random Strangers treatment. We also include fixed effects for each
round, and interact those with the Partners/Strangers treatment.
Our estimated model based on the data from Andreoni [1988] finds no significant difference
between Partners and Random Strangers. There is generally no difference in terms of whether
subjects decide to contribute anything at all, or in terms of what level of contribution they would
21  The only effect that we observe is a fascinating one in terms of the underlying static game theory:
an end-period effect. Andreoni [1988; p.295] explains that “... we expect that giving by Partners will be greater
than giving by [Random] Strangers, especially early in the game (before the Partners begin to ‘bail out’). In the
tenth round, however, both Partners and Strangers are playing an end-game, hence both are predicted to free
ride.” However, in the last round we find that Random Strangers are 17 percentage points more  likely to
contribute some amount, and this effect is statistically significant (p-value = 0.028). This end-game effect is
not sufficient overall to offset the conclusion that Random Strangers and Partners are behaving similarly in
these experiments.
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make if positive. We do find statistically significant round effects, but these are common to the
Partners and Random Strangers treatments.21
The data from the experiments of Croson [1996], tell an even stronger story. Estimating the
same statistical model with her data, over all 20 rounds, we find a large effect from Random Strangers
on the propensity to free ride, compared to Partners, and no effect at all on the level of contributions
conditional on making any. Random Strangers are 42.5 percentage points less likely overall to make
any contribution, and this is a significant effect (p-value = 0.004). They are estimated to contribute
11.1 percentage points more conditional on making any contribution at all, but this is not statistically
different from zero (p-value = 0.31).
Thus, these statistical results show a qualitative effect on behavior such that Random
Strangers elicits more subjects to focus on the zero contribution response, but with no effect on the
conditional contributions.
5. Conclusions
We find a significant effect from the use of a design that ensures a zero probability of re-
encounters between subjects, the Perfect Strangers design. Our experiment and statistical analysis
provide evidence that it not only moves subjects towards the prediction of standard theory for one-
shot games, but it significantly increases the fraction of subjects that behave exactly according to the
one-shot prediction from the outset. Further, in our Random Strangers design we find that the size of
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the cohort plays a significant role, increasing the fraction of NE players as the group size increases,
causing the probability of re-encounters to decrease. We  conclude that Random Strangers will not
necessarily implement a one-shot environment. It appears that the fraction of subjects that perceive
the environment as having reputation effects is smaller in Random Strangers than in Partners, but still
larger than in Perfect Strangers. In addition, this fraction increases as the cohort size increases in the
Random Strangers design. We conjecture that Perfect Strangers designs will have comparable effects
in other strategic experimental tasks in which there may be effects from the subjects behaving as if in
a repeated game. 
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Each experiment had 10 rounds of one regime, followed by 10 rounds of the other regime
Session
Return to
Public Good Anonymity N in Session History
A Low Perfect 26 NP-P
B Low Perfect 24 P-NP
C High Perfect 26 NP-P
D High Perfect 26 P-NP
E High Random 10 P-NP
F High Random 16 P-NP
G High Random 8 P-NP
H High Random 6 P-NP
I High Random 8 NP-P
J High Random 6 NP-P
K High Random 6 NP-P
L High Random 8 NP-P
M High Random 10 NP-P
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Figure 1: Average Contributions
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Figure 3: First Round Distribution of Fractional Contributions
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Pstrangers Perfect strangers 180 0.57 0.50 0 1
Csize Cohort size for RS 180 4.20 5.34 0 16
np_p Sequence 180 0.50 0.50 0 1
High High reward for contributions 180 0.72 0.45 0 1
Age Age 180 21.51 2.65 18 36
Male Male 180 0.64 0.48 0 1
Black Black 180 0.08 0.28 0 1
Asian Asian 180 0.08 0.28 0 1
Hispanic Hispanic 180 0.13 0.33 0 1
White White 180 0.66 0.48 0 1
OtherRace Other Race 180 0.04 0.21 0 1
Business Business major 180 0.43 0.50 0 1
PreSenior Pre-senior 180 0.47 0.50 0 1
GPAlow Low GPA 180 0.47 0.50 0 1
GPAhigh High GPA 180 0.15 0.36 0 1
HHsize Size of household 180 1.65 1.26 1 7
Work Any work 180 0.72 0.45 0 1
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Hurdle Model of Contributions
Marginal effects for " and  $ parameters
N=1800 responses from 180 subjects; Wald test of H0: "=$=0 has P225 = 115.5 (p-value<0.001)
Parameter Variable Description Estimate SE p-value 95% Confidence Intervals
" Pstrangers Perfect strangers -0.299 0.156 0.055 -0.605 0.007
Csize Cohort size for Random strangers -0.024 0.015 0.119 -0.054 0.006
np_p Sequence 0.255 0.063 0.000 0.132 0.378
High High reward for contributing 0.373 0.070 0.000 0.236 0.511
Age Age 0.021 0.012 0.089 -0.003 0.045
Male Male -0.041 0.071 0.565 -0.181 0.099
Black Black 0.082 0.125 0.509 -0.162 0.327
Asian Asian -0.041 0.103 0.694 -0.243 0.162
Hispanic Hispanic 0.130 0.082 0.111 -0.030 0.291
OtherRace Other Race 0.109 0.137 0.425 -0.159 0.378
Business Business major -0.092 0.068 0.176 -0.225 0.041
PreSenior Pre-senior 0.088 0.067 0.186 -0.043 0.219
GPAlow Low GPA 0.180 0.069 0.009 0.045 0.315
GPAhigh High GPA -0.081 0.096 0.401 -0.270 0.108
HHsize Size of household -0.021 0.025 0.415 -0.071 0.029
Work Any work 0.078 0.064 0.222 -0.047 0.204
PeriodNP2 Period 2 -0.028 0.037 0.454 -0.100 0.045
PeriodNP3 Period 3 -0.081 0.037 0.031 -0.153 -0.008
PeriodNP4 Period 4 -0.109 0.038 0.004 -0.183 -0.035
PeriodNP5 Period 5 -0.133 0.038 0.001 -0.208 -0.058
PeriodNP6 Period 6 -0.195 0.042 0.000 -0.278 -0.111
PeriodNP7 Period 7 -0.239 0.041 0.000 -0.319 -0.159
PeriodNP8 Period 8 -0.212 0.043 0.000 -0.296 -0.128
PeriodNP9 Period 9 -0.257 0.040 0.000 -0.336 -0.178
PeriodNP10 Period 10 -0.301 0.040 0.000 -0.378 -0.223
$ Pstrangers Perfect strangers -0.141 0.100 0.160 -0.338 0.056
Csize Cohort size for Random strangers -0.015 0.010 0.130 -0.034 0.004
np_p Sequence 0.045 0.050 0.374 -0.054 0.143
High High reward for contribution 0.288 0.055 0.000 0.181 0.395
Age Age -0.003 0.013 0.842 -0.028 0.023
Male Male 0.139 0.045 0.002 0.050 0.228
Black Black -0.016 0.095 0.863 -0.202 0.170
Asian Asian -0.043 0.080 0.589 -0.199 0.113
Hispanic Hispanic -0.104 0.074 0.159 -0.248 0.041
OtherRace Other Race -0.009 0.077 0.905 -0.161 0.142
Business Business major 0.074 0.051 0.142 -0.025 0.174
PreSenior Pre-Senior -0.005 0.055 0.930 -0.112 0.103
GPAlow Low GPA -0.087 0.050 0.083 -0.185 0.012
GPAhigh High GPA -0.042 0.079 0.600 -0.197 0.114
HHsize Size of household 0.015 0.019 0.429 -0.022 0.051
Work Any work 0.118 0.063 0.061 -0.005 0.241
PeriodNP2 Period 2 0.026 0.025 0.290 -0.022 0.075
PeriodNP3 Period 3 0.026 0.030 0.378 -0.032 0.085
PeriodNP4 Period 4 -0.027 0.029 0.341 -0.083 0.029
PeriodNP5 Period 5 -0.027 0.033 0.422 -0.092 0.038
PeriodNP6 Period 6 -0.029 0.034 0.392 -0.095 0.037
PeriodNP7 Period 7 -0.023 0.037 0.533 -0.094 0.049
PeriodNP8 Period 8 -0.006 0.037 0.876 -0.077 0.066
PeriodNP9 Period 9 -0.036 0.038 0.347 -0.110 0.039
PeriodNP10 Period 10 -0.039 0.038 0.305 -0.114 0.036
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